Bazball – Why It Works, And Why It Sometimes Doesn’t

It’s been over a year since Brendon McCullum and Ben Stokes took charge of the England Test team, and it’s fair to say that it has been a success. Won 13, Lost 4, Drew 1. It is a historically good record. They won 3-0 against the previous World Test Championship winners last year, defeated the number one ICC ranked Test team, and then became the only team in history to win three Tests in Pakistan. Drawing 2-2 against the new World Test Champions would have seemed like a remarkable achievement 14 months ago, but now feels like a disappointment.

As American football coach Bill Parcells once said, “You are what your record says you are.” England are an impressively strong Test team now, and almost everyone (aside from Australians) would have to concede ‘Bazball’ works.

The interesting thing for me is defining what ‘Bazball’ is. There are two popular uses of the term. The first is simply as a truism, that Bazball is anything that a team coached by Baz McCullum does. The second is that it centres around a mentality of mindless aggression, particularly in terms of the batting. Neither seems particularly fair to me. For all the laid back approach, the golfing away days and so on, there does genuinely seem to be a lot of thought and insight into how England are playing now.

Breaking With Tradition

It is a fascinating aspect of almost all sports to me, how orthodox tactics become so entrenched within a game that coaches and players are almost risking their careers if they try something different. The example I would use is American football (sorry Chris). After a team scores a touchdown (the equivalent of a rugby try), they have two choices: To kick the ball through the goal from 15 yards away for one point, or attempt to score another touchdown from two yards away in a single play for two points. The kicks are scored about 94% of the time, and roughly 50% of plays from two yards out work, which means that the latter nets teams 0.06 extra points per touchdown on average. The funny thing is that almost everyone in the sport knows always going for two points is the better, more productive choice for many teams but no coach is brave enough to do it.

The reason is that many prominent voices in the sports media (and, let’s be honest, a lot of fans too) can’t wait to attack anyone who doesn’t play the game the way they think it should be played. Typically this means how they remember it from their childhood. This resistance to change can leave sports stagnant and unable to adapt to new realities. So it is that the ‘normal’ defensive approach to Test batting has persevered through decades, centuries even, to the present day.

A lot has changed in Tests over the past fifty years. Pitches are flatter, covered, and more consistent now. Batters have larger bats, helmets, and extensive training in scoring shots thanks to T20 cricket. The professionalism, fitness, and preparation for modern players are leaps and bounds beyond what was the case even twenty years ago. And yet, despite all this, most people’s perception of what an ideal Test batting innings should look like has changed very little.

The funny thing is that I look back on Test cricket, with the benefit of hindsight, I do see hints that point to why England’s Bazball batting is working now. Whenever an edge flew over the slips and the commentator would always say “If you’re going to flash, flash hard!”, because everyone knew that aggressive shots were less likely to be caught in the slip cordon. Perhaps more pertinently, the few stand out innings by greats such as Pietersen, Sehwag or Lara where they would just go berserk and the opposition seemingly had no answer for how to deal with it. The field would be spread, chances fell into gaps and everyone would applaud the audacity and effectiveness of the batting whilst simultaneously assuming that it wouldn’t work with lesser mortals, or in most conditions.

The conventional approach to setting a field in Test cricket is simple. For your good deliveries, place catching fielders where edges from a fend or prod might go. For your bad deliveries, place a few on the boundary to minimise the opponent’s runscoring. I remember hearing someone summarise the differing approaches of red and white ball cricket several years ago. In Tests, you have defensive batting against attacking bowling. In T20s, you have defensive bowling against attacking batting. With Bazball, that no longer applies. Deliveries on or near the stumps are just as likely to be scored off as any other, which means that the opposition have to radically alter their own tactics. As it stands, even teams with strong bowling units seem unable to counter this England batting lineup.

The new batting approach also seems to be helping England’s batters develop whilst in the Test team. When McCullum and Stokes came in, Joe Root was the only player in the squad to have a Test average above 40. For several years now, promising batters would come into the England dressing room only to become progressively worse over time. Now, both Ben Duckett and Harry Brook have career Test batting averages above 40.

My suspicion is that England’s batting malaise over the past decade has been caused in part by overcoaching. Batters have been given complex (and often conflicting) guidance from coaches and analysts within the England setup, which meant that they didn’t have any sense of clarity what they should be doing at the crease. This led to indecision, being fractionally late in their shots, which led to wickets and loss of confidence. That loss of confidence led to even greater hesitancy, and their batting average spiralled as a result. Bazball’s batting approach, to attack the ball whenever possible, simplifies the mental process at the crease. A confident attacking stroke is less likely to lead to a wicket than an indecisive defence, as well as obviously producing more runs as a result.

Returning To Tradition

Regardless of the previous section, it would be foolish to suggest that everything about England’s approach to Test cricket has to ‘reinvent the wheel’, so to speak. Some things are traditional because they work.

This year’s first Ashes Test aside, it is an absolute necessity to take 20 wickets in order to win in that format. Whilst the aggression of England’s batting unit has been largely making the headlines, there has also been a similar change in intent from their bowling and fielding. It is noticeable that there have been more deliveries targeting the wickets, and more close catchers being used through the innings.

Where England’s changes to their batting are without precedent in Test history, their bowling approach could almost be considered old fashioned. It was only in 2010 that England switched to ‘bowling dry’, being focused on reducing the opponent’s scoring rate rather attempting to take wickets as quickly as possible. The traditional Test bowling tactic was always to prioritise dismissing the batter over everything else.

The approach can best be described as the fielding captain doing whatever the batters don’t want them to do. Does a batter prefer being surrounded with fielders in close positions, including in their eyeline, over having a few boundary riders which might restrict scoring but also allow easy singles? Do they like having to play every single delivery because it’s near the stumps, or being able to leave every ball from the over? We all know the answer to these questions, which is perhaps why Bazball isn’t getting much credit for the change. Some things are so glaringly obvious that it seems ridiculous teams weren’t already doing it.

Prioritising taking wickets over economy rates presents a number of advantages for the team. It increases the likelihood that England will make early inroads with the new ball, which is particularly crucial if you don’t have some 2018 Dukes balls stashed away somewhere. Shorter innings means a lower workload for the bowlers (as well as less rest for the opposition bowlers), and reduce the probability of a draw. Perhaps most importantly for England, having shorter innings reduces their need for a spin bowler. This is not an area of strength for England, and hasn’t been since 2014.

Luck and Momentum

It’s easily forgotten how fortunate England were to win their first two Tests in the Bazball era. In both matches, New Zealand lost one of their bowlers to injury during the game. Root and Bairstow’s fourth innings heroics, whilst tremendously impressive, were against an overstretched and tired bowling unit. Those wins seemingly gave the England side a huge burst of confidence, particularly after a lacklustre winter, and allowed them to believe that their approach could work against the best teams in the world.

One of the interesting parallels to observe with Bazball is its similarity to England during Trevor’s Bayliss’ time as head coach. Selecting aggressive batters, playing batters out of position, picking inexperienced players on a hunch. These are all things which failed five years ago, but seem to work now. There are two obvious differences. One is the captain. Ben Stokes is far more attacking and proactive than Joe Root. The other is England’s form. Players coming into the squad now have a luxury which hasn’t been the case for over a decade; They are joining a team which is more likely than not to win the match. That is huge.

Success often seems to breed success in sports. Football teams with recent triumphs are just able to win 50-50 contests, snatch undeserved points or otherwise come through pressure unscathed. There’s an inbuilt confidence throughout the squad that they can recover from any position, no matter how dire. This England team has that, and it’s just plain fun to watch.

When It Doesn’t Work

If there is one thing which annoys me about batting in Test cricket, it is the half-hearted fend or prod to a delivery which is short and/or wide of the stumps. I simply don’t see the point in it. The best case scenario is that the ball hits the face of the bat and there’s no run, which would also be the outcome if the batter left it, but with the risk of catching the edge and losing a wicket. It is a high risk, low reward shot, and England are still guilty of playing it pretty often. I would rather they threw the bat at it, and at least score some runs, than keep doing it.

That’s right, I’m complaining that England’s batting isn’t aggressive enough.

On the same theme, there have been times in games when the team’s confidence and commitment to the Bazball approach has deserted them. On Day 5 in the first Ashes Test, England had virtually every player on the boundary whilst Cummins was on strike rather than actively trying to take his wicket. He’s Australia’s number 8 and you would normally back your bowlers to dismiss a lower order batter relatively cheaply, even with an old ball. Instead, England gifted him single after single just for the chance to bowl a few deliveries at Nathan Lyon. After the previous 12 months, it was an oddly defensive and archetypal England captain’s choice to make.

The failure to fully commit to doing what their opponent would least like them to do at any given point is perhaps best exemplified by the declaration on the very first day of this Ashes series. With 6 overs left in the day and Joe Root steaming along at roughly 10 runs per over, Ben Stokes declared. Given the choice between Joe Root continuing or essentially dismissing him and having to face 4 overs in relatively benign conditions, I feel certain Australia would have chosen the latter. This was a rare moment in Bazball when I just couldn’t fathom any logical reasoning behind Stokes’ decision.

Australia will also have been delighted by England selecting a patently unfit Bairstow over Foakes as their wicketkeeper. That choice arguably cost England the series, with Bairstow missing as many chances as he took in the first two matches. There are two aspects to this decision which made it questionable even within the context of Bazball. The first is that it ignored the strategy of being aggressive as the fielding team. Ben Foakes is a threat to the opponent’s batters in a way Bairstow wasn’t even at his physical peak. Not unlike having a short leg or silly mid off, both fielding positions Stokes is more likely to employ than his predecessors, even the knowledge Foakes is behind them plays on the minds of the batters.

The other issue is the lack of loyalty shown to Ben Foakes. He was England’s first-choice keeper for the first year of Bazball, a period in which they won all but two matches. He played well with both bat and gloves. He did everything asked of him, and was still dropped for an unfit replacement. For a team which has put great stock in standing by underperforming players and not changing a winning formula, it just felt incredibly weird. And it’s going to feel even weirder in 4 months’ time, when England will almost certainly select Ben Foakes as their wicketkeeper for the next Test series in India.

It may be a choice which also harms Bairstow in the long run too. As the only England men’s player who is seemingly in the first choice team for all three formats, as well as being an integral member of Welsh Fire’s squad in The Hundred, he looks set to play at least 7 consecutive months of solid cricket. He is a 33 year old wicketkeeper who has just returned from a serious injury. No one doubts his commitment or desire, but it may not be wise to put so much strain on him.

There’s definitely more good than bad with regards to England’s Bazball approach, but there is always room for improvement. With over five months until their next Test match, likely on dusty Indian pitches, I have no idea what will happen next. Who they will pick, how they will play. But that’s a lot better than being certain they will lose, as I was 15 months ago.

Thank you for reading. If you have any comments about the post, or anything else, please post them below.

12 thoughts on “Bazball – Why It Works, And Why It Sometimes Doesn’t

  1. maggiej's avatar maggiej Aug 12, 2023 / 1:50 pm

    I am a huge fan of Foakes and agree that there is a case to be made that we wouldn’t have lost those first 2 tests if he had been keeping. The problem with the winter though seems to me to depend on a) if Stokes is able to bowl and b) if Pope is fit again. If a) they presumably will feel they need another bowling allrounder eg Woakes or Jacks, as for some reason they don’t seem to rate Foakes’s batting. So that would leave him out as i can’t see them doing a straight replacement with Bairstow. And if Pope is fit again, they will presumably have him back (loyalty again plus he is VC) and again won’t be able to fit Foakes into the equation without dropping one of the batsmen. Have heard many people say he should keep in India but it’s tricky to see how they can do it. Would be interested in others’ thoughts.

    Like

    • maggiej's avatar maggiej Aug 12, 2023 / 1:52 pm

      Sorry, missed out a not – a) should be if Stokes can’t bowl!

      Like

    • Marek's avatar Marek Aug 12, 2023 / 10:27 pm

      I think you’re spot on, Maggie. I’d actually be surprised if Foakes plays for England again. As you say, Stokes not being fit to bowl (or play) leaves five batters, five bowlers plus Bairstow–and they clearly don’t want to play around with the middle order so that would leave either Stokes or Pope at three; if Stokes is fit to bowl, then he’s one of the five bowlers and Pope bats at three and Bairstow at seven.

      There’s another reason too, though: Foakes is simply not Bazball enough, and the ideology of Bazball seems to be at least as important, and probably much more so, than people’s performances as measured in statistics. So first, from that point of view there’s no reason to drop Bairstow (or one of the top three, which is the other realistic option) for Foakes anyway; after all, if they didn’t when Bairstow’s keeping was coming close to costing England the Ashes, why would they in India?. Second, Foakes’s more watchful batting will be seen either as a liability (he’s not a “game-defining” batter as is Crawley, despite the fact that his test record as a batter has generally been better) or as selfish (Stokes apparently made some interesting comments last winter about an innings of Daryl Mitchell’s, which was essentially trying to farm the strike so that the scale of an inevitable defeat was minimised rather than swinging for the hills and going down by 100 runs instead of 70, to the effect that anyone who played like that for England would never play again).

      I totally agree with Danny though, that it’s curious that the aggression of Bazball doesn’t seem to apply to keeping. It never is. I remember once seeing Jack Russell get a Player-of-the-Match award in a cup final in a game where he scored a duck; he got it for the most stupendously aggressive display of keeping which I’ve ever seen, which both rattled the opposition batters and got a couple of them out in stumpings which I wouldn’t have believed were possible if I hadn’t been watching!

      Like

      • maggiej's avatar maggiej Aug 13, 2023 / 5:39 am

        Interesting point about Bazball aggression not applying to keeping. The other point about having Foakes is in addition to giving the batsmen some concern as Danny observed, it must give the bowlers a lot of confidence to know that an edge or a dance down the wicket are likely to result in a catch or stumping.

        Like

  2. andrewrdow's avatar andrewrdow Aug 13, 2023 / 4:48 pm

    Another element of why Foakes’ selection might assist the general “Bazball” approach of trying to make things happen that puts more pressure on the opposition is that it supports the bowlers more, as it increases the probability of a chance being taken.

    Even when England are playing bouncerball with the old ball, they are trying to make the batsman do something unusual and outside their comfort zone, instead of allowing them to nurdle the score along at 2 or 3 an over. If a bowler creates a chance, Foakes’ selection increases the possibility of it being taken, especially if the field is spread for a hook or pull, without a slip.
    Watching Foakes at the Oval against Middlesex, the ball seemed to make a different sound going into his gloves, and his athleticism means he covers a lot of ground for a tall man.

    How do we know he cannot add a ramp shot or reverse sweep to his batting armoury? Even if he does not, does it matter? Root has added new shots (or plays shots outside the orthodox range more often now), but still has an exceptional set of standard shots that he can rely upon until really set, which are normally enough to either maintain or increase the scoring rate.

    What are the things that really change the course of a game? – Runs scored in big partnerships at a good rate, and wickets taken in bursts. Were Foakes to come in with the score at 240 and the run rate at 6.5, and help add another 70 with the overall run rate slipping to 4, that’s still only 77.5 overs used up.

    Is it not a case of players overall “buying into” the overall concept, but also with the overall objective of ALSO getting the team into a strong position? The first test declaration is a case in point here, as the original article mentions.

    Would we be quite so relaxed about the “new direction” if we’d lost this Ashes series 0 – 5, with various turning points attributed to this more “Gung Ho” attitude?

    Like

  3. quebecer's avatar quebecer Aug 15, 2023 / 7:11 pm

    Firstly, Ben Foakes didn’t quite do everything asked. He messed up the run chase in Wellington, and if he’d got England over the line there, it would have been almost impossible to drop him – but he didn’t, and in a team that is highly competitive for places now, those are the fine lines we’re talking about.

    Secondly, regarding the few stand out innings you point to (Pietersen, Sehwag etc.): can I suggest it’s not about what they did with the bat but what was going on between the ears at those moments? That’s the point about Bazball – it gets everything that could get in the way of a player doing as well as they can OUT of the way. It’s less like a Lara innings, and more like Morpheus telling Neo, “You’ve got to let it all go… fear, doubt, disbelief,” because only then can you do what you’re able.

    However, what’s new about it is installing it at a team rather than individual level. If it’s Sehwag going bonkers, people just smile and shrug and say, Oh that Virender. Similarly, Aussies always respected how Botham/Flintoff/Pietersen came at them, but take their approach of no fear and back yourself in to a team context, and Aussies and others don’t like it nearly as much. What is also clear from this is that the New England approach (can’t bring myself to say Bazball) is that it is really unpleasant to play against.

    Of course, the whole thing is in line with every piece of research and literature in the field of applied/sports psychology, which seems to be completely ignored.

    Like

    • Marek's avatar Marek Aug 16, 2023 / 10:09 pm

      Isn’t part of the Foakes thing though: the choice at the beginning of the summer was essentially him or Crawley, and in what way could Crawley SHOW (as opposed to give off a vague vibe) that he’d actually got England over the line? Especially on any kind of regular basis?

      Like

    • dannycricket's avatar dannycricket Aug 18, 2023 / 8:08 am

      Foakes ‘messed up’ the Wellington run chase by attempting to hit a six for the win and being caught on the boundary. If he had kept hitting singles, the safer but less Bazball option, England might well have won. Holding that against him seems a little unfair, if the argument is that six-hitting is a requirement for a wicketkeeper to play in this team.

      I’m always somewhat sceptical of the success of sports psychology, As is common with such things, you always hear a lot about it when a team or athlete wins, but never when they lose. When England failed to reach the semi-finals in every Men’s ODI World Cup between 1996 and 2015, they had sports psychologists (at the very least since 2002 or so). It seems to me that backroom staff like this take credit for every victory and disappear into the background for every defeat.

      I suspect teams will adapt to playing against Bazball to an extent. The obvious approach to a team batting like they are in a T20 is to use T20-style bowling. Short of a length, forcing the batters to play the ball on the up, and mixing up the pace to encourage mis-hits.

      Like

      • quebecer's avatar quebecer Aug 19, 2023 / 2:11 am

        The point about Foakes messing up the chase is that if he hadn’t it would have been virtually impossible to drop him. The manner of the dismissal isn’t the point: had he won it, you simply cannot drop him for the next game. But he didn’t, and left open the possibility. At top level sport, these are the things that matter (or at least should matter).

        As for Sports Psychology, I’ve got a masters’ degree, and you’re right in that it doesn’t know much apart from the obvious (in line with the rest of psychology). However, when the little that is known is misunderstood and improperly applied, you get what you’ve observed. Sometimes you can’t blame a whole field and its research because English cricket doesn’t always get things right. But again, what is known within the field and its academic research, McCullum knows. He’s not just making shit up, and it sometimes feels that’s what people think.

        Like

      • Marek's avatar Marek Aug 19, 2023 / 10:03 am

        Could you be a bit more specific, Quebecer, about what it is that McCullum knows that he’s got from sports psychology research? I’m curious…

        Like

  4. Marek's avatar Marek Aug 16, 2023 / 8:47 pm

    One thing that comes to my mind most times I read about the innovations of Bazball–especially given that the emphasis is usually on how England bat rather than how they bowl…and certainly not on how they keep wicket!!–is that it simply wouldn’t have been possible when I was growing up. That’s not because of anything about psychology, fear or disbelief, but simply because the rules and practices of the game compared to that time–especially on bat sizes and weights, but also on boundary size–have unbalanced the game immensely in favour of batters.

    So in some ways it’s a manifestation more than anything of current cricket’s obsession with hitting boundaries, and simply applying it to test cricket.

    I think I’m generally fairly agnostic about Bazball. It’s clearly good fun to watch, it’s produced some riveting matches, and it’s been successful out of all recognition compared to anything that came before it in an England test shirt.

    I’m still somewhat sceptical that the entertainment angle will work in terms of spectator numbers in the long term–mainly because it seems to me to be turning test cricket into what is essentially a very long T20. But the attraction of T20 is at least partly that, in a time-poor society, it’s shorter, and it’s cheaper–so why not go and watch a T20 in that case?

    Personally I’m also a little sceptical that it is by definition more entertaining. It is if sixes=entertainment, but for me one of the charms of long-format cricket is that it’s more subtle than that (and again, if you want less subtle, why not watch a T20?)

    But there’s one aspect which makes my blood boil, and that’s the sanctimonious obsession that England are saving test cricket. That’s a triumph of hubris over analytical thinking of any depth at all. Test cricket is not being killed by being too boring (or for that matter, by the ICC take on it, lack of context). It’s being killed by a combination of world cricket being controlled by one board which doesn’t want to keep the other countries alive by sharing too much of its money except on its own terms, by vast injections of cash from businesspeople “outside cricket” over whom no board other than the BCCI has any control at all and who often don’t give two hoots about the traditions of cricket compared to the imperatives of making a large profit, and by the greed of the leading players.

    So you can play how you want, test cricket will probably be pretty much dead by the end of this decade. The 2027 Ashes could well be the last five-test Ashes, the test summer could soon be relegated to September (because how are you going to raise a test team when they’re all off playing for Seattle Orcas in June and July?), and tests could well be something that only exists if the Big Three are one of the competing teams. With it will go all domestic cricket as we currently know it, all red-ball cricket and all 50-over cricket.

    How a team plays won’t make a blind bit of difference to that. The BCCI sharing its money more would. The ICC being much firmer with T20 franchise leagues would. A test match fund would. Limiting the number of NOCs a player can get per year would.

    The leading players playing in the Championship rather than the IPL in May and June–not because it’s better for their skills but because it’s better for the whole infrastructure of the game, as opposed to the infrastructure that supports 90 leading players–and not bailing out of international tours to play for Lahore Qualanders would (and huge respect here for Mitchell Starc, who I think is the only leading white-ball player to put his money where his mouth is and do that).

    But scoring at 5.6 an over rather than 3.6? Get real!

    Like

Leave a reply to quebecer Cancel reply